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There is no consensus on the causes of 
inequality. Some blame policies. For instance, 
Stiglitz (2014) argues that for the United States 
“In virtually every domain, we have made deci-
sions that help enrich the top at the expense of 
the rest.” Others pose that inequality is inher-
ent in a market-based economic system. For 
instance, according to Muller (2013, p. 30), 
“Inequality is an inevitable product of capitalist 
activity, and expanding equality of opportunity 
only increases it—because some individuals and 
communities are simply better able than others 
to exploit the opportunities for development and 
advancement that capitalism affords.” However, 
countries with similar market-based economic 
systems exhibit differences in income inequality. 
Recent research suggests that  ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization explains these cross-country 
differences in income redistribution (cf. Desmet, 
Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg 2012).
This paper makes the following contributions. 
First, we examine the relationship between cap-
italism and income inequality for a large sample 
of countries using an adjusted economic free-
dom (EF) index as a proxy for capitalism and 
Gini coefficients as proxy for income inequal-
ity. Previous research on this relationship yields 
conflicting findings and suffers from several 
shortcomings. Most importantly, these studies 
did not adjust the EF index and thereby included 
redistribution policies in this proxy for capital-
ism. We only include components that relate to 
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legal structure and security of property rights, 
freedom to trade internationally, and regula-
tion of credit, labor, and business. Furthermore, 
previous studies often use income inequality 
after redistribution as a dependent variable. To 
properly test the view put forward by Muller (2013), we employ income inequality before 
redistribution. We do not find a robust relation-
ship between economic freedom and income 
inequality.
Second, we analyze the relationship between 
income redistribution and fractionalization. 
According to Becker (1957), individuals have 
stronger feelings of empathy toward their own 
group and this implies that countries where 
there is strong fractionalization exhibit lower 
levels of redistribution. Some recent papers 
provide cross-country evidence for this (e.g., 
Desmet, Weber, and Ortuño-Ortín 2009; 
Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg 2012). 
However, these studies measure redistribution 
by the share of transfers and subsidies to GDP. 
This is highly problematic as most of the redis-
tribution occurs through the tax system. We 
therefore use the ratio of the income distribution 
resulting from market processes and that after 
redistribution as our proxy for income redistri-
bution. Our results suggest that the impact of 
 ethno-linguistic fractionalization is conditional 
on the level of economic freedom: countries that 
have a high degree of fractionalization have less 
income redistribution, while capitalist countries 
that have a low degree of fractionalization have 
more income distribution.
I. Economic Freedom and Income Inequality
Although De Soto (2000) argues that eco-
nomic freedom opens economic opportunities 
to less privileged and lower income individu-
als, thereby decreasing inequality, the prevalent 
view is that more freedom promotes growth 
at the expense of increased income inequality 
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within countries (Bergh and Nilsson 2010). We 
examine the relationship between capitalism and 
income inequality using some parts of the Fraser 
Institute’s EF index as a proxy for capitalism.
The EF index is a composite index. Most 
previous studies on the relationship between 
economic freedom and income inequality 
employ the aggregate EF index. This leads to 
biased estimates as the aggregate index includes 
income redistribution via the government sector 
and inflation.1 The EF index is available for a 
large group of countries at five-year intervals. 
As a dependent variable we use Gini coeffi-
cients based on households’ income from Solt’s (2009) Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database (SWIID). We construct averages of 
the Gini coefficients across five years to align 
them with the frequency of the EF index.2 Gini 
coefficients can be calculated for gross income (i.e., before taxes and transfers) and net income (i.e., after taxes and transfers). In this part of the 
analysis we use gross income Gini coefficients, 
as we are interested in the income distribution 
resulting from market processes.
The control variables have been selected 
based on previous studies. We include the log of 
real GDP per capita to correct for any distribu-
tional effects driven by income levels (cf. Barro 
2000). In line with the Kuznets hypothesis, we 
expect inequality to decrease with higher levels 
of development.
Parts of the KOF economic globalization 
index are included, as several authors have 
argued that economic globalization has led to 
more within-country income inequality (see, 
for instance, Feenstra and Hanson 1996).3 Since 
Jaumotte, Lall, and Papageorgiou (2013) find 
1 Indeed, the papers discussed in the next section examin-
ing the relationship between redistribution and fractionaliza-
tion draw their measure of redistribution from the EF index. 
2 To be precise, the EF index reflects the time period 
t − 3, when the five-years average of the Gini coefficients 
is centered at period t. Also the control variables have been 
constructed in this way. This time lag is to avoid endogeneity 
issues. 
3 The KOF economic globalization index consists of two 
parts. Whereas the first part is based on actual across border 
flow data (trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio invest-
ment, and income payments), the second part looks into 
trade restrictions like the existence of hidden import barriers, 
tariff rates, taxes on trade, and capital account restrictions. 
As this latter part is in essence also included in the EF index, 
we only take the economic globalization part that relates to 
actual flows. 
that trade openness is associated with lower 
income inequality, while increased financial 
openness is associated with higher income 
inequality, we include the trade to GDP ratio (percent) and the stock of FDI (as percent of 
GDP) separately.
Education has been argued to affect income 
inequality as well (cf. Barro 2000). Therefore, 
we include the share of the population that has 
completed secondary education. We include the 
share of the labor force employed in the agri-
cultural sector to control for the structure of the 
economy (cf. Jaumotte, Lall, and Papageorgiou 
2013).
Table 1 summarizes the main results for an 
unbalanced panel of up to 108 countries over the 
period 1971–2010, i.e., eight five-year intervals. 
In the first column, only our adjusted measure 
of economic freedom is included. Subsequently, 
GDP per capita is added. This variable is highly 
significant and therefore retained in the other 
specifications. The remaining two columns 
show those results in which other controls 
variables also turn significant. Besides GDP 
per capita only economic globalization and its 
subcomponent financial globalization are sig-
nificant. The insignificance of trade openness (not shown) suggests that it is notably financial 
Table 1—Relation between Capitalism  
and Income Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Economic 0.112 0.013 −0.047 0.124
 freedom (0.237) (0.028) (−0.098) (0.250)
GDP per 4.899*** 4.867*** 4.205***
 capita (2.509) (2.693) (2.085)
Economic 0.143***
 globalization (3.366)
Stock of FDI 0.059**
(2.342)
Observations 545 538 507 418
Countries 108 105 103 103
R2 0.037 0.099 0.143 0.101
Notes: This table shows panel estimates for the relation-
ship between five-year averages of the market Gini coef-
ficients and economic freedom. All explanatory variables 
are lagged. All estimations include country- and time-fixed 
effects. T-statistics based on clustered standard errors are in 
parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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globalization driving the finding that economic 
globalization explains income inequality. The 
variables capturing education and the structure 
of the economy are not significant (not shown). 
The coefficient of our main variable of interest, 
the EF index, is negative, but not significantly 
different from zero. We therefore conclude that 
economic freedom is not robustly related to 
within country income inequality.4
II. Redistribution and Ethnic Fractionalization
If Becker’s (1957) view is correct that indi-
viduals have stronger feelings of empathy 
toward their own group, it is not surprising that 
the United States, where there is a strong racial 
component to the income distribution, exhib-
its lower levels of redistribution than Western 
European countries (Desmet, Weber, and 
Ortuño-Ortín 2009). Several papers report evi-
dence that ethno-linguistic fractionalization is 
negatively related to income distribution. While 
several studies examine this relationship at the 
micro level (see Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and 
Wacziarg 2012 for a further discussion), oth-
ers present evidence at the macro level. Barro (2000) does not find any significant relationship 
between Gini coefficients and ethno-linguistic 
and religious fractionalization measures, but La 
Porta et al. (1999) report that ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, measured by an average of five 
existing indices of fractionalization, generally 
has a negative impact on several measures of 
public goods, such as literacy rates, infant mor-
tality, and school attainment that may be related 
to redistribution.
While Alesina et al. (2003) report that the 
effect of ethno-linguistic fractionalization on 
redistribution appears sensitive to the inclu-
sion of control variables, Desmet, Weber, and 
Ortuño-Ortín (2009) and Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, 
and Wacziarg (2012) find more robust evidence 
for a negative association. Desmet, Weber, and 
Ortuño-Ortín (2009) conclude that linguistic 
fractionalization is negatively associated with 
redistribution. However, this result does not 
hold when measures of fractionalization do not 
account for the degree of linguistic distance 
4 This conclusion is neither sensitive to other permuta-
tions of the explanatory variables, nor to the removal of the 
time-fixed effects. Results are available in Sturm and De 
Haan (2015). 
between groups, suggesting that the depth of 
linguistic cleavages matters. Likewise, Desmet, 
Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012) find that 
linguistic diversity negatively affects redistribu-
tion, but the effect becomes smaller and insig-
nificant at lower levels of aggregation. This 
suggests that “solidarity travels without trouble 
across groups that are separated by shallow gul-
lies, but not across those separated by deep can-
yons” (p. 332).
Insightful as they may be, the latter three 
studies measure redistribution by the share of 
transfers and subsidies to GDP. This is highly 
problematic as most of the redistribution 
within countries occurs through the tax system. 
Furthermore, a substantial part of transfers and 
subsidies is not aimed at redistribution. That is 
why we use the ratio between the income distri-
bution resulting from market processes and the 
income distribution after redistribution. Both 
distributions are proxied by Gini coefficients.
The studies discussed use different frac-
tionalization measures. Most are based on lan-
guage, but as Alesina et al. (2003) point out this 
may not always capture fractionalization. For 
instance, in Latin America several countries are 
relatively homogeneous in terms of language 
spoken, frequently the one of former colonizers, 
but much less so in terms of skin color or racial 
origin. That is why they develop measures for 
fractionalization of ethnicity, language, and 
religion. Desmet, Weber, and Ortuño-Ortín (2009) develop two indices. One index mea-
sures the probability of two randomly chosen 
individuals being from different ethno-linguis-
tic groups and does not take into account the 
distances between the different groups (ELF), 
while the other one takes distances between 
different groups taken into account. Desmet, 
Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012) construct 
an ethno-linguistic fractionalization at 15 dif-
ferent levels of aggregation based on language 
trees. But only at a high level of aggregation (i.e., ELF1), the relationship with income dis-
tribution is significant. That is why we only use 
this measure in our analysis. In total we have 
six fractionalization measures. The correlation 
between these different fractionalization mea-
sures is often very low. That is why we use them 
all in our regressions.
Table 2 presents regression outcomes using 
the different fractionalization measures. As frac-
tionalization is not time-varying, we estimate 
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OLS cross-country regressions. We use data for (the period around) 2003, because this yields 
the largest sample. In all regressions we include 
the interaction between fractionalization and our 
adjusted economic freedom measure. The coef-
ficients of the ethnic fractionalization measure 
of Alesina et al. (2003) and its interaction term 
with economic freedom are individually and 
jointly significant. Hence, the impact of ethnic 
fractionalization on income redistribution is 
conditional on the degree of capitalism.5
To illustrate this conditionality, Figure 1 
shows the predicted values of the redistribution 
ratio as a function of the level of fractionaliza-
tion and conditional on three different levels of 
economic freedom based on the first column of 
Table 2.6 It shows that no significant redistribu-
tion takes place in highly fractionalized coun-
tries, i.e., the ratio between the market and the 
net Gini coefficients is not statistically different 
from one. The level of economic freedom does 
5 As a robustness check we have added several controls 
to the models presented and changed the sample period to 
reflect different time periods. This does not affect the coef-
ficients of our variables of interest in any notable way as 
shown in Sturm and De Haan (2015). 
6 Figures for the other measures of fractionalization are 
very similar and available in Sturm and De Haan (2015). 
not matter in that case. However, at low levels of 
fractionalization, countries having a high level 
of economic freedom do show significantly 
more redistribution than countries having a low 
Table 2—Explaining Income Redistribution
Alesina et al. (2003) Desmet, Weber, and Ortuño-Ortin (2009) andDesmet, Ortuño-Ortin, and Wacziarg (2012)
Ethnical frac. Linguistic frac. Religious frac. ELF ELF-distance ELF1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EF 0.163*** 0.154*** 0.170*** 0.153*** 0.127*** 0.120***
(7.017) (6.335) (6.239) (6.555) (7.024) (7.002)
Frac. 1.066*** 0.817** 0.758** 0.741** 1.055* 0.666
(3.260) (2.339) (2.149) (2.452) (1.793) (1.104)
EFxFrac. −0.205*** −0.143** −0.133** −0.137*** −0.200** −0.135
 (−4.113) (−2.598) (−2.521) (−2.883) (−2.179) (−1.438)
Constant 0.205 0.208 0.126 0.232 0.386*** 0.429***
(1.232) (1.253) (0.705) (1.452) (3.115) (3.651)
Observations 103 102 103 101 101 102
R2 0.526 0.429 0.430 0.454 0.439 0.423
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio between market and net Gini coefficients. EF, Frac., and EFxFrac represent, respec-
tively lagged Economic Freedom, Fractionalization, and their interaction. The header of each column indicates which fraction-
alization measure is used. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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Figure 1. Impact of Fractionalization on Income 
Redistribution Conditional on the Level of Economic 
Freedom
Notes: Based on the first column in Table 2. The predicted 
values for the redistribution ratio are given for all levels of 
fractionalization and three different values of the level of 
economic freedom. EF-p10, EF-p50, and EF-p90 equal the 
values of economic freedom representing its tenth, fiftieth, 
and ninetieth percentile, respectively. The predictions are 
shown together with their 95 percent confidence intervals.
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level of economic freedom. For most other mea-
sures of fractionalization we find similar results.
III. Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the relation-
ship between capitalism and income inequal-
ity for a large sample of countries using an 
adjusted economic freedom index as a proxy 
for capitalism and Gini coefficients based on 
gross income as a proxy for income inequal-
ity. Our results suggest that there is no robust 
relationship between economic freedom and 
income inequality. In addition, we analyze the 
relationship between income redistribution (measured by the ratio of the income distribu-
tion resulting from market processes and the 
income distribution after redistribution) and 
 ethno-linguistic fractionalization. We find that 
the impact of  ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
on income redistribution is conditional on the 
level of economic freedom: countries that have 
a high degree of fractionalization have limited 
or no income redistribution, while capitalist 
countries that have a low degree of fraction-
alization have a substantial degree of income 
redistribution.
REFERENCES
Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, Wil-
liam Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wac-
ziarg. 2003. “Fractionalization.” Journal of 
Economic Growth 8 (2): 155–94.
Barro, Robert J. 2000. “Inequality and Growth 
in a Panel of Countries.” Journal of Economic 
Growth 5 (1): 5–32.
Becker, Gary S. 1957. The Economics of Discrim-
ination. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bergh, Andreas, and Therese Nilsson. 2010. “Do 
Liberalization and Globalization Increase 
Income Inequality?” European Journal of 
Political Economy 26 (4): 488–505.
Desmet, Klaus, Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, and Romain 
Wacziarg. 2012. “The Political Economy of 
Linguistic Cleavages.” Journal of Develop-
ment Economics 97 (2): 322–38.
Desmet, Klaus, Shlomo Weber, and Ignacio 
Ortuño-Ortín. 2009. “Linguistic Diversity and 
Redistribution.” Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association 7 (6): 1291–1318.
De Soto, Hernando. 2000. The Mystery of Cap-
ital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West 
and Fails Everywhere Else. New York: Basic 
Books.
Feenstra, Robert C., and Gordon H. Hanson. 
1996. “Globalization, Outsourcing, and Wage 
Inequality.” American Economic Review 86 (2): 240–45.
Jaumotte, Florence, Subir Lall, and Chris Papa-
georgiou. 2013. “Rising Income Inequality: 
Technology, or Trade and Financial Globaliza-
tion?” IMF Economic Review 61 (2): 271–309. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. 1999. 
“The Quality of Government.” Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization 15 (1): 222–79.
Muller, Jerry Z. 2013. “Capitalism and Inequality.” 
 Foreign Affairs, March/April, 30-51.
Solt, Frederick. 2009. “Standardizing the World 
Income Inequality Database.” Social Science 
Quarterly 90 (2): 231–42.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2014. The Price of Inequal-
ity: Why Inequality Matters and What Can 
Be Done About It: Hearing on Opportunity, 
Mobility, and Inequality in Today’s Economy, 
Before the Senate Budget Committee (state-
ment of Joseph Stiglitz, Professor of Econom-
ics, Columbia University).
Sturm, Jan-Egbert, and Jakob De Haan. 
2015. “Income Inequality, Capitalism and 
 Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization.” Munich: 
CESifo Working Paper 5169.
This article has been cited by:
1. Ekaterina Borisova, Andrei Govorun, Denis Ivanov, Irina Levina. 2018. Social capital and preferences
for redistribution to target groups. European Journal of Political Economy 54, 56-67. [Crossref]
2. Bilin Neyapti. 2018. Income distribution and economic crises. International Finance 37. . [Crossref]
3. Raufhon Salahodjaev, Satoshi Kanazawa. 2018. WHY DO SOCIETIES WITH HIGHER
AVERAGE COGNITIVE ABILITY HAVE LOWER INCOME INEQUALITY? THE ROLE OF
REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES. Journal of Biosocial Science 50:03, 347-364. [Crossref]
4. Md. Rabiul Islam, Jakob B. Madsen, Hristos Doucouliagos. 2018. Does inequality constrain the power
to tax? Evidence from the OECD. European Journal of Political Economy 52, 1-17. [Crossref]
5. Md. Rabiul Islam. 2018. Wealth inequality, democracy and economic freedom. Journal of Comparative
Economics . [Crossref]
6. Karsten Staehr. 2017. The Choice of Reforms and Economic System in the Baltic States. Comparative
Economic Studies 59:4, 498-519. [Crossref]
7. Jan-Egbert Sturm. 2017. Political Economy Aspects of Income (Re-) Distribution. European Journal
of Political Economy 50, 52-53. [Crossref]
8. Weihua An, Maoliang Ye. 2017. Mind the gap: Disparity in redistributive preference between political
elites and the public in China. European Journal of Political Economy 50, 75-91. [Crossref]
9. Daniel L. Bennett, Boris Nikolaev. 2017. On the ambiguous economic freedom–inequality
relationship. Empirical Economics 53:2, 717-754. [Crossref]
10. Boris Nikolaev, Christopher Boudreaux, Rauf Salahodjaev. 2017. Are individualistic societies less
equal? Evidence from the parasite stress theory of values. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
138, 30-49. [Crossref]
11. Mahyudin Ahmad. 2017. Economic Freedom and Income Inequality: Does Political Regime Matter?.
Economies 5:2, 18. [Crossref]
12. Jakob de Haan, Jan-Egbert Sturm. 2017. Finance and income inequality: A review and new evidence.
European Journal of Political Economy . [Crossref]
13. Nicholas Apergis, Arusha Cooray. 2017. Economic Freedom and Income Inequality: Evidence from a
Panel of Global Economies- A Linear and a Non-Linear Long-Run Analysis. The Manchester School
85:1, 88-105. [Crossref]
14. Tim Krieger, Daniel Meierrieks. 2016. Political capitalism: The interaction between income
inequality, economic freedom and democracy. European Journal of Political Economy 45, 115-132.
[Crossref]
15. Daryna Grechyna. 2016. On the determinants of political polarization. Economics Letters 144, 10-14.
[Crossref]
16. DANIEL L. BENNETT, BORIS NIKOLAEV. 2016. Factor endowments, the rule of law and
structural inequality. Journal of Institutional Economics 1-23. [Crossref]
17. John C. Anyanwu, Andrew E. O. Erhijakpor, Emeka Obi. 2016. Empirical Analysis of the Key Drivers
of Income Inequality in West Africa. African Development Review 28:1, 18-38. [Crossref]
18. Silke Bumann, Robert Lensink. 2016. Capital account liberalization and income inequality. Journal
of International Money and Finance 61, 143-162. [Crossref]
19. Giacomo Corneo, Frank Neher. 2015. Democratic redistribution and rule of the majority. European
Journal of Political Economy 40, 96-109. [Crossref]
